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Abstract— As automated driving vehicles become more so-
phisticated and pervasive, it is increasingly important to assure
its safety even in the presence of faults. This paper presents
a simulation-based fault injection approach (Sabotage) aimed
at assessing the safety of automated vehicle functions. In
particular, we focus on a case study to forecast fault effects
during the model-based design of a lateral control function.
The goal is to determine the acceptable fault detection interval
for permanent faults based on the maximum lateral error and
steering saturation. In this work, we performed fault injection
simulations to derive the most appropriate safety goals, safety
requirements, and fault handling strategies at an early concept
phase of an ISO 26262-compliant safety assessment process.
I. INTRODUCTION
New technologies like driverless vehicles have the poten-
tial to bring major benefits to road transportation. Due to the
fact that the world is hazardous and complex, there is no
hesitation that building such robust and dependable highly
automated systems leads to many technological challenges
as never known before. Those challenges are constituted
as three main pillars underpinning the way towards de-
pendable systems of systems: (i) novel technologies and
architecture solutions are needed to reach a certain degree
of dependability [1], (ii) dependability assurance is getting
more complicated and (iii) novel techniques are required to
help assuring dependability concerns.
As stated, the complexity of safety assessments increases
with the number of non-predictable situations. Up to today,
that process has been mainly driven by analyses techniques
such as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effect Analysis), FTA
(Fault Tree Analysis) or DFA (Dependent Failure Analysis).
However, sometimes a failure effect is not clearly known
in advance. Furthermore, to achieve the highest integrity
levels not only safety analyses but test-based evidences
proving those statements are required. In brief, to cope
with that complexity, the aforementioned techniques shall
be completed with Fault Injection (FI).
So far, few studies have focused on the intensive testing of
autonomous systems in realistic simulation environments [2].
Building up a robust simulation framework, where vehicle
dynamics is combined with FI, would allow an early safety
assessment supported by safety and controllability related
simulation data. According to Koopman [3], controllability
stands for ensuring the ability to avoid a specified harm or
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damage through the timely reactions of the vehicle, assuming
the driver is out of the loop. In contrast, ISO 26262 [4]
introduced a different controllability definition, centred on
the driver’s ability to control the vehicle. The next version
of ISO 26262 will likely need to adjust the controllability
definition to highly automated driving (HAD).
A promising approach is to use FI [5] [6] already in
early development phases. Considering engineering needs
to prove fault reaction time being shorter than FTTI (Fault
Tolerant Time Interval) and any fault reaction is completed
before a hazardous event occurs, a good estimation of those
values is relevant. In fact, academia, industry and ISO 26262
have mostly considered FI as a way to verify how good
safety mechanisms are designed (Fault Removal) but not
for dependability evaluation (Fault Forecasting) already at
ISO 26262-3 concept phase which is the main goal of our
work. For instance, Svenningson [7] investigated the benefits
from conducting FI experiments on behavioural models of
software. This approach is defined as model-implemented
FI, since a model is extended with artefacts to support the
injection of fault effects during simulation. Another similar
approach is introduced in [8] which is developed as a plug-
in to SCADE (Safety-Critical Application Development En-
vironment). Although those approaches aim at determining
failure effects, they cannot be acquired at vehicle level since
no vehicle dynamics is taken into account. Moreover, no
controllability values are estimated and no concept phase
issues are tackled. The most similar work to ours, it is
addressed by Silveira et al. [9] who described a co-simulation
framework including Matlab and CarSim (vehicle dynamics)
for evaluating the stability of electrical vehicles using FI.
However, this latter work did not analyse controllability
challenges and fail-operational issues, which are relevant
factors for automated driving.
Only few works tackled FI-usage during early design
phases. Pintard [10] established how FI can be applied on
both sides of ISO 26262’s V-Cycle. Yet its usage at concept
phase, the development of a simulation-based FI framework
and controllability issues are out of scope.
The work underlying this paper intends to present our
simulation-based FI framework called Sabotage applied at
the ISO 26262 concept phase. This includes forecasting fault
effects, getting representative FTTIs and deriving the safety
goals and the functional safety requirements. Our approach
has been evaluated on a Lateral Control.
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Section II
presents the automated vehicle control architecture. There-
after, in Section III we describe the Sabotage tool framework
and how to apply it during the concept phase of ISO 26262.
Then, the previous methodology is applied to a Lateral
Control. Finally, Section V presents conclusions leading to
an outlook on future work.
II. AUTOMATED VEHICLE CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
To better understand the current situation concerning
highly automated vehicle (HAV) architectures, an overall
overview of them will be introduced. Nowadays, the algo-
rithms embedded on those applications are marked by the
integration of different subsystems on a modular architecture.
This separation in different modules reduces the time for
troubleshooting possible failures but at the cost of more
complicated allocation of functions. As a consequence, prop-
erties such as freedom from interference [4] turns into a
more complicated issue to prove. The architecture is mainly
divided into the Lateral and Longitudinal Control. The aim
of the Lateral Control is to steer the vehicle along the best
trajectory of the circuit. For this purpose, the steering wheel
is adjusted by choosing the correct trajectory depending on
the vehicle and environment states. This item is composed
of three essential functions:
• Behavioural Planner chooses the best trajectory de-
pending on the vehicle manoeuvre (i.e. lane keeping,
lane changing or avoiding an obstacle). It consists of
three main sub-functions: Local Planner, Perception and
Decision. The Local Planner gathers information from
sensors so the current position value on the road is
computed by the adequate processing. The Perception
sub-function gets data from the vehicle (e.g. encoders,
IMU) and environment state sensor (e.g. Camera and
Lidar) fusing the information of the environment around
the vehicle. At last, the Decision sub-function generates
the best trajectory tracked by the vehicle.
• Trajectory Controller tries to keep the vehicle on the
correct trajectory. To do so, the lateral error, the angular
error and the curvature of the path are sent to the steer-
ing function. The algorithm chosen for the evaluation
of this design is the so-called Control Law algorithm
and it is defined by the following (1):
Cv = K1 ∗ elat +K2 ∗ eang +K3 ∗ Curvature (1)
• Steering Function controls the steering wheel to place
the vehicle on its trajectory. It receives the corrected
value as input from the Trajectory Controller.
Whereas the Lateral Control is responsible for steering,
the Longitudinal Control maintains the vehicle along its
trajectory by managing the acceleration and braking systems.
It is divided into Behavioural Planner, Trajectory Controller,
Acceleration and Braking functions (out of scope).
III. SABOTAGE FRAMEWORK ACCORDING TO ISO 26262
A. Sabotage: block diagram
Once the architecture for HAD has been introduced, it is
important to understand why FI can be seen as a complemen-
tary approach when evaluating the safety of HAV functions.
As previously stated, FI establishes itself as a promising
technique to evaluate the safety and controllability of such
systems. In fact, compared to formal methods or mutation
testing (removal of systematic faults), our work evaluates the
effect and fault handling of faults occurring during run-time.
Thus, Fig. 1 illustrates our approach based on a simulation-
based FI solution for safety assessment of automated vehicle
functions. Since not all controllability values and failure
effects can be known in advance, our approach provides
assistance (i.e. fault forecasting) to evaluate the safety of
a certain architecture in early design phases. By using that
simulation data, a trade-off between the most suitable safety
concepts is possible. Even though FI sounds as a promising
approach, it requires the user to have a basic knowledge of
the system i.e. random FI might not be feasible in practice.
Fig. 1: Sabotage: Simulation-based FI Framework
After pointing out the main benefits of performing FI, the
main flow of our approach will be explained. To begin with,
the main functions of the item must be established and its
malfunctions (e.g. omission) specified. Then, the functional
failure modes are properly identified in order to get data
regarding its effects (at system/vehicle level). This means
that if those failure modes are defined at system level its
effects are seen at vehicle level. On the contrary, if the
functional failure modes are specified at component level,
those effects would lead to system and vehicle level fail-
ures/hazards. Those malfunctions/failure modes are related
with a generic fault model saved on the so-called generic
fault model library (Omission, Frozen, Delay, Invert, Oscil-
lation, Random). These generic fault models are prearranged
and their role is to simulate specific fault models of any
component/system functional failure mode. The creation of
these templates helps the user to perform the relation between
any failure mode and its respective generic fault model
template, ensuring the user does not provoke systematic
faults. For example, the code of a generic Omission fault
model is shown in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Stuck at last value
Require: input,pos,simutime
1: if pos == triggerpos then
2: freeze=input;
3: while simutime <= triggerpos do return freeze;
4: else
5: return input;
After conducting a preliminary analysis of the system,
the FI experiments have to be configured as part of a
Workload Generator which includes setting the experiments
and driving scenarios, and generating the fault list:
• Target: where should the fault be injected?
• Fault Model: what is the most appropriate fault model
representing the functional failure mode?
• Target: where should the fault be injected?
• Trigger: how should the fault be triggered in the system?
• What is the fault effect observation point?
• How should the condition making the vehicle losing its
controllability be defined?
Certainly, those issues are arduous to overcome and that
is why the art of applying FI is neither spread enough
nor mature. For each fault the user wants to inject, the
information referring to Fault Model,Target Signal (Fault
Location), Fault Trigger based on time or driving circuit
position coordinates (X, Y) and Fault Duration must be
collected within a fault list. That information is the starting
point to generate the saboteur. Saboteurs are components
added to system behavioural models for the sole purpose
of FI. One of them is injected per target signal and its
configuration regarding the fault model and the triggering
condition is the one established as part of the fault list
information. It is worth stressing that by injecting an unique
saboteur on a target signal, different fault models might be
reproduced just by changing the injection trigger.
The configuration of the experiments requires a vehicle
selection and a definition of an operational situation:
• Location: highway, urban;
• Road conditions: uphill, on a curve;
• Environment conditions: good conditions, heavy rain;
• Traffic situations: fluent;
• Vehicle Speed (kph)
• Manoeuvres: parking, overtaking, lane keeping;
• People at Risk: Driver, passenger, pedestrians;
The Scenario Configurator chooses the best driving sce-
nario saved in the Scenario Catalogue, which represents the
previously defined operational situation, in order to load it
into the Dynacar platform. The Dynacar platform [11] is a
real-time vehicle dynamics simulation. This virtual solution
based on multiple domain vehicle models provides high-
fidelity of vehicle physics permitting a real time simulation
combined with a notable modality and interfering options. It
allows the mixing of virtual or real electronic control units,
vehicle sensor and vehicle control variables. The critical
systems are limited by dynamics since actuators and sensors
need an interval time to respond. Through this, the FTTI
values concerning vehicle level effects can be estimated.
At last, the so-called faulty system under test must be
created. To achieve that goal, the Fault Injector module
creates the saboteurs’ code based on the information coming
from the fault list together with the generic fault model code
templates. This process based on libraries and lists allows
to automate FI simulations. After the faulty SUT is created,
its results are compared with respect to a golden (fault free)
simulation run so the proper safety requirement conditions
can be derived. To sum up, our approach helps the designer
to avoid user faults, to get more reliable results and to save
time and costs through its comprehensive automation.
B. Using Sabotage at ISO 26262 concept phase
During the set up and the design of the previously men-
tioned methodology, ISO 26262 has always been present.
Nevertheless, the following question arises: how relevant is
FI for ISO 26262? As pointed out, the current version of ISO
26262 is mostly driven by safety analyses techniques when
enumerating known failure modes, deriving potential effects
and getting the proper safety requirements. The same applies
to the right hand of the V-model where safety analysis is used
to assess the safety of the system, software or hardware.
Yet the uncertainty related to HAD makes safety analy-
sis definitely not sufficient, requiring additional virtual and
simulation solutions. As a result, FI poses as a viable and
complementary solution to the aforementioned safety assess-
ment technique. One of the main reasons behind this is the
difficulty of figuring out the system reaction under the effect
of real faults. The same reason applies to the derivation of the
safety goals and the functional safety requirements (FSR).
In few words, this methodology supports Hazard Analysis
and Risk Assessment (HARA) by FI simulations. Before
completing any simulation, the item should be defined and
its main functions and failure modes (e.g. omission) listed.
In the same way, a preliminary architecture is mandatory in
order to know which functional failure modes could lead
to system or vehicle failures and hazards. To set up the
FI scenarios the fault list and the driving circuit settings
(operating scenarios) are needed. As already depicted, after
configuring the circuit settings, the aforementioned fault
list is created. Once FI simulations are configured and the
faulty SUT created, golden and faulty simulations are run
and results processed. As a result of those simulations, the
following outputs are obtained:
1) Hazard identification by FI instead of using Preliminary
Hazard Analysis or FMEA. Those hazards (e.g. vehicle
does not try to turn when it should) can be visually seen
through Dynacar virtual environment.
2) Safety goal refinement based on simulation results and
hazard identification.
3) Definition of FTTI and establishment of the safe state.
As seen in Fig. 2, FTTI is the measured time from
a fault is injected until a hazard can occur. Setting
different fault durations, the fault detection time at
system/component level and FTTI are obtained. As
the application domain is HAD, FTTI determines the
required level of fault tolerance (i.e. redundancy, grace-
ful degradation) not to lose the controllability of the
vehicle.
Fig. 2: Fault-Error-Failure Chain and FTTI Definition
4) Comparing golden vs faulty simulations the safety re-
quirements can be appropriately derived as the maxi-
mum difference between the two simulations without
losing the controllability of the vehicle.
5) As a consequence of the previous results, those require-
ments will be allocated in a functional safety concept.
IV. SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE LATERAL CONTROL
As explained in Section III, automated guidance must
be simultaneously performed with the Longitudinal and
Lateral Control. Since ensuring functional safety is a vital
requirement, this section presents a safety evaluation for an
existing Lateral Control system behavioural model for which
no safety mechanisms were in place. The FI simulations have
been performed to address the following issues:
1) Acquire data regarding vehicle and item level effects
based on FI simulation results.
2) Complete the safety analysis, define the FTTI values,
the safe states, the FSRs and the safety concept. This
means developing a fault tolerant Lateral Control to
avoid possible hazards and ensuring a certain degree
of dependability by fail-operational or graceful degra-
dation.
A. Item Definition
As explained in Section II, the Lateral Control item can
be decomposed in several functions and sub-functions and its
malfunctions consist of: Steering (Ommission, Commission),
Trajectory Controller (Omission, Commission), Behavioural
Planner (Unwanted Local Planner, Unwanted Perception,
Unwanted Decision). This information is absolutely neces-
sary in order to properly configure the required fault models
starting from the defined malfunctions.
B. Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment
After accomplishing the item definition, HARA should
be performed by evaluating it without internal safety mech-
anisms. As said, instead of performing it analytically, FI
testing has been used as a way of determining unknown
effects and deriving the safety requirements. These testing
experiments require the definition of an operational situation
where a specific vehicle and driving circuit scenario shall
be chosen. The last one is configured considering the most
critical situation for the Lateral Control function which is
recognized as an urban city with fluent traffic. The vehicle
selected for those experiments is the so-called Twizzy Re-
nault which is driving at a constant speed of 45km/h and
performing lane keeping manoeuvre. The malfunctions are
triggered while the vehicle is driving on a curve. In order
to see system and vehicle level effects, functional failure
modes related to the DGPS (Differential GPS) and Steering
system have been reproduced. The fault list (cf. Table I) is
specified as follows: fault durations are randomly filled in as
multiple of the simulator resolution (1ms) and triggers are
curve positions (X,Y).
Component Target Fault Model Fault dur Trigger
DGPS X,Y FrozenLastValue 100ms 15m,20m
DGPS X,Y Delay 120ms 18m,24m
Steering Steering FrozenLastValue 80ms 15m,20m
TABLE I: Example of a fault list
By applying the process explained in Section III, the
configurable saboteurs are automatically injected based on
a previously built up fault list. In this case, those faults
are triggered at several curve points so the most critical
ones can be derived. Since our FI campaigns pursue the
calculation of the FTTI values applied to the Lateral Control,
the observation signals can be the lateral error and the
steering saturation. For this, Fig. 3 depicts the basis for FTTI
calculation in the case of the steering function of the Lateral
Control.
Fig. 3: Basis for FTTI calculation
To establish the controllability loss criteria, the formula 2
is used which defines the maximum lateral error:
LateralErrorMax =
(Lane− V ehicle)Width
2
(2)
Table II depicts how the information regarding Hazard
Analysis has been obtained based on FI simulation results. To
do so, item level malfunctions have been modelled by means
of generic fault models which allow to measure vehicle level
effects and to properly define the safety goals.
Fault Model Potential Effect Hazard
Steering
FrozenOut-
OfRange
Steering shaft
broken
Sudden
steering
leading to a
possible
accident
Frozen
SteeringValue-
Max/Min and
Invert
High change of
the steering
angle value
Vehicle can
roll/spin and
passengers can
be injured
FrozenLast-
Value Frozen Steering
Vehicle out of
lane
Delay Late Steering
Vehicle is
never placed
on the correct
trajectory
Trajectory
Controller
FrozenLast-
Value
Variation
Correction (Cv)
does not change
Vehicle out of
lane
FrozenOut-
ofRange
Controller
Saturation
Vehicle is
never placed
on the correct
trajectory
Behavioural
Planner
FrozenLast-
Value
The trajectory is
not updated
Vehicle follows
a not updated
trajectory
FrozenRandom
Behavioural
Planner changes
the trajectory and
sudden steeering
Vehicle may
spin/roll and
out of the lane
and passengers
can be injured
TABLE II: Failure effects at vehicle level
After conducting the FI experiments, Table III has been
filled in and the safety goals better elicited (cf. Table IV).
Each line represents the FTTI value for the most severe
failure mode (represented as a fault model) of a specific
function computed as illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Its
associated fault duration depicts the time to handle the
fault in an appropriate way (transition to a safe state). For
example, a fault related to the trajectory controller can be
present in the system for 400 ms before a hazardous event
occurs: 240 ms to detect and react, and 160 ms added time
to control the fault not to violate the safety goal.
Function Fault Model SG Safe State FTTI(ms)
Fault
dur(ms)
Steering Frozen Value
Max/Min
SG1 Fail-operational 196 70
Behavioural
Planner
Frozen Ran-
dom
SG2
Graceful
degradation
and control
to the driver
327 155
Trajectory
Controller
Frozen Out-
ofRange SG3
Graceful
degradation
and control to
the driver
400 240
TABLE III: Lateral Control: HARA
Safety
Goal Definition
SG1
The item must never apply a high torque value related to a
sudden steering
SG2
For a sensor data that supports the fact that the vehicle is
lane keeping on an urban curve, the item shall establish a
new trajectory without performing a sudden steering
SG3
The vehicle shall be able to properly adjust its trajectory
according to a non-saturated controller value
TABLE IV: Lateral Control: definition of the safety goals
On the basis of the safety goals, FSRs have been redefined
based on the FI simulation results (see Table V). The
maximum lateral error is analytically calculated as depicted
in (3).
LateralErrorMax =
3, 5− 1, 9
2
= 0, 8[m] (3)
FSR Definition
FSR1 The LateralError must be less than LateralErrorMax
FSR2
For a velocity input less than 45 km/h and sensor data that
supports the fact that the vehicle is travelling on a Urban
curve, the Yaw rate shall not increase more than 15% respect
to a good behaviour.
FSR3 Cv value of the controller shall not be saturated [-1, 1].
FSR4
The range of the steering shall be between [-540, 540]
degrees.
TABLE V: Lateral Control: definition of safety requirements
Together with the previous results and instead of carrying
out DFA by traditional techniques, simulation results have
been used. The main outcome is that freedom from inter-
ference is not assured in the current design of the Lateral
Control. Hence, its architecture will need to be redesigned
to ensure that property. Fig. 4 illustrates those interdepen-
dencies and how some failure modes such as Unwanted
Behavioural Planner and Unwanted Trajectory Controller are
considered dependent failures.
C. Functional Safety Concept at Architectural Level
In the evaluation of safety concepts, one of the main
outcomes is that the steering system shall be redundant in
order to achieve the required level of availability. A fault
related to the steering function must be controlled within
196 ms in order to prevent a hazard to happen, i.e. vehicle
can roll/spin and passenger can be injured. Accordingly, the
steering function must be available within 70 ms. Regarding
failures related to behavioural planner, e.g. leading from
DGPS faults, graceful degradation might be sufficient since
fault reaction time is 155 ms. To finish with, the different
functions must be properly separated to avoid cascading
failures to occur.
Fig. 4: Lateral Control: Fault Tree Analysis completed by FI simulations
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper describes the Sabotage simulation-based fault
injection approach to assess the safety properties of au-
tomated vehicle functions. Simulation-based fault injection
is a technique that uses a series of high-level abstractions
or models representing the system under study to evaluate
its dependability during conceptual and design phases. Our
approach has been evaluated on a case study for the model-
based design of a lateral control function embedded in an
urban vehicle. From a novelty standpoint, we focused on the
determination of the fault detection interval for permanent
faults based on the maximum lateral error and steering satu-
ration, as a vehicle controllability property. A major strength
of the method introduced in this paper is its integration
with HARA activities, which enables a seamless ISO 26262-
compliant safety assessment process. Our future work aims
at relaxing the fault simulation constraints to instrument the
tooling automated assessment work. This includes: (1) to add
the capability of collapsing and automating the injection of
faults at post-processing stage, (2) the definition of generic
fault models to be ready available in a database, (3) the
evaluation of the acceptable time for switching the control to
the driver while ensuring controllability, (4) to increase the
automation of the full fault injection process from HARA
to the generation of assessment reports and (5) to compare
simulation results with runtime behaviour of real vehicles.
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